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Anyone  wlio  has read  about,  or seen
on TV,  the destruction  of  Grozny  in
Chechnya  during  the fall  and winter  of
1994-5  comes  away  with  at least  three
impressions.'  One  is that  Russia  attacked
the  Chechen  capital  without  serious  provo-
cation,  forcing  the  Chechen  rebels  to fight
for  the freedom  of  their  territory  and
people.  Another  is that  the conflict  is the
outcome  of  many  local  ethnic  ri'valries  that
are somehow  related  to rejection  of
Russia's  renewed  imperialism  in areas  of
the former  Soviet  Union.  In both  these
scenarios,  the  American  reader  may  imag-
ine similarities  to the strue=le  of  the Bal-
tic  states  against  the  Soviets,  or to the re-
volt  of  the  American  colonies  against  the
British.
The  tl"iird  impression  is related  to
analyses  that  go deeper  than  the simple
comparison  to the  struggle  of  subordinate
states  against  their  overiords.  Some  have
discussed  the long-standing  ethnic  rival-
ries  in the region,  especially  between
Ossetian,  Ingush,  Chechen,  and Russian
ethnic  partisans,  and  the eagemess  of  such
groups  to establish  predominance  in the
area  north  of  the Caucasus  mountains,  or
simply  to survive  as a people.  Others  have
dared  to say that  for  years  some  Chechens
have  promoted  a sophisticated,  mafia-style
trade  regime  for  weapons,  drugs,  gold,  cars
and other  lucrative  businesses  that  has re-
suited  in a vicious  environment  conducive
to instability.  The  murder  of  an anti-mafia
TV personality  in Moscow  in March,
1995, suggests  that  those  in Russia  and  the
Caucasus  who  mav  have considered  ar-
ticulating  this  stance  will  now  for  the most
part  be publicly  silent.  Still  other  analysts
have  noted  the difference  behveen  the por-
trayal  of  Russian  and  Chechen  leadership
in the West:  Boris  \eltsin  was  often  de-
picted  as a bumbling  member  of  the old
guard,  while  Dzokhar  Dudaev,  the
Chechen  president,  tended  to be described
as a hero  leading  his oppressed  people  to
freedom.
'vVhile  these  analyses  are helpful,  they
do not  fully  illuminate  the complex  inter-
actions  tliat  characterize  the  relationships
between  ethnic  groups  in this  troubled
area.  This  essay  will  attemptto  shed  mere
specific  Iight  on the  trials  and  tribulations
of  tl"ie people  living  in this  region,  paying
special  attention  to the formation  of  eth-
nicity  in some  of  the groups.
In the historv  of  nations,  as thev  are
called  in the  area,  or ethnic  groups,  as they
are now  usually  called  in the West,  the past
plays  a very  important  role  in dealing  with
and accommodating  the present  Ethnic
groups  in part  are born  of  the space  they
occupy  on the globe,  the landscape  that
nourishes  them,  the language  that  becomes
their  access  to the world,  the songs  that
offer  enjoyment  in their  adulthood,  the
God  or the gods who  provide  solace  in
their  hardships,  and the common  values
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that  all  members  speak  about  frequently.
They  also  become  a distinct  group  by
elaborating  their  own  past  and thereby
separating  themselves  from  others  who
live  in the  same  area.  By  keeping  alive  past
events  and  personages  which  focus  them
as a peculiar  people,  they  are able  to pro-
vide  substance  to the language  they  utter,
the songs  they  sing,  the  prayers  they  of-
fer,  the  land  they  populate.
Many  factors  define  a group.  Historic
events  and  personalities,  glorious  battles
and  miserable  defeats,  or great  deeds  and
tragic  deaths  of  individuals  are all impor-
tant  aspects  of  group  identity.  For  most
ethnic  groups,  it is relatively  easy  to deal
with  the  glorious  moments,  the heroes,  and
the martyrs.  But,  as Vamik  Volkan  and
Nomian  Itzkowitz  (1994)  show  in their
recent  book  Turks  and  Greeks,  most  eth-
nic  groups  encounter  greater  difficulty  in
dealing  with  the defeats.  Such  traumatic
losses  may  enter  the very  essence  of  a
group  because  the  loss  is too  painful  to be
openly  elaborated  within  it, and finds  ex-
pression  only  in campaigns  against  those
who  won.  The  glorious  moments  and  the
great  heroes  do not  leave  a residue  of  hos-
tility  and  resentment,  or  urges  for  revenge
that  are created  by  the  often-traumatic  and
mythologized  memories  of  defeats.  Hun-
dreds  of  years  may  have  passed  since  an
event's  occunence,  like  the  Turk's  defeat
of  the  Serbs  at Kosovo  in 1389  or  the  con-
quest  of  Constantinople  in 1453,  yet  the
need  for  atonement  persists.  Serbs  and
Greeks,  unable  to moum  these  momentous
events,  have  woven  them  into  a clearly
visible  and  felt  thread  of  their  ethnic  iden-
tity  by hoping  and  working  for  revenge;
thus  today  Serbs  accuse  their  Moslem
neighbors  of  being  Turks,  and  Greeks  see
an expansionist  Turkey  that  must  be
stopped.  Part  of  the  mechanism  invol'ved
in this  process  is that  the defeated  ethnic
group  feels  humiliated  or victimized;  in
their  inability  to mourn  the  event  and  thus
integrate  it realistically  into  their  behav-
ior,  they  are unable  to move  on with  life
and  positively  contribute  to their  region.
Identity  in the  Caucasus
In the Caucasus,  the ethnic  content  of
each  group's  sense  of  itselfmay  be traced
back  at least  as far  as the  Mongolian  (or
Tatar)  period,  that  is, the first  half  of  the
thirteenth  century.  The  Caucasus  is topo-
graphicaIly,  climatically,  ethnologically,
and linguistically  one of  the most  varied
regions  on earth.  All  the same,  the  region
attained  a historical  unity  because  of  its
important  position  as a mountain  range
between  two  seas and a crossing  point  of
international  trade  routes.  For  these  two
major  reasons  alone,  the Caucasus  has
been  a battleground  of  peoples,  cultures,
and  religions  since  ancienttimes.  Greeks,
Romans,  Persians,  Arabs,  Turks,  Mongols,
and Russians  all  were  involved  in the
Caiicasus  and have  fought  over  it. But  it
was the Mongol  conquest  of  the area  in
the 1220s  and 1230s,  and the later  raids
by Timur,  that  determined  the future  of
the  Caucasus.  The  way  each  group  reacted
to the  Tatars-how  they  rejected  or inte-
grated  the  invasions  and  the  occupation-
led to ethnic  differentiation.  Those  who
retreated  into  the mountains  built  stone
fortresses  and  established  a mountain  cul-
ture;  those  who  cooperated  with  the  Tatars
remained  in tThe fertile  plains  north  of  the
Caucasus  and  in time  became  an ethnically
mixed  group  with  a different  feudal  pat-
tem  for  sustaining  themselves.
The  invasion,  the lengthy  occupation,
and  the  rejection  or  accommodation  of  the
various  groups  who  then  Iived  in the area
became  one anchor  around  which  differ-
ent ethnic  identities  were  formed.  Even
before  the invasion  of  the Mongols,  the
various  ethnic  groups  in the region  told
their  histories  and tied  their  people  to-
gether  through  epic  poetry,  such  as the
OssetianLegendsofthelv'arts.  Inthisway,
each  group  recalled  and  elaborated  events
that  had taken  place  hundreds  and even
thousands  of  years  earlier.  But  the Mon-
golian  invasion  was  of  such  intensity  that
it became  the defining  moment  for  the
many  ethnic  groups  who  lived  north  of  the
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Caucasus.  In particular,  the groups  who
retreated  into  the mountains  recalled  and
constantly  elaborated  on the terrible  de-
feats  suffered  at the  hands  of  the
Mongols-defeats  so devastating  that  they
could  never  be resolved.  These  memories,
which  one  may  call  chosen  traumas  (Vol-
kan,  1991),  were  readily  substituted  for  an
accurate  and  systematic  written  history.
Today  it is difficult  to define  precisely
how  each  individual  traces  his or her  eth-
nicity  to the Mongol  in'vasion  and  occu-
pation,  in part  because  some  of  the  same
stories  characterize  all the ethnic  groups
ir)the  area.  For  example,  Tatars,  Ossetians,
Ingushs,  and  Chechens  see the  Alans,  who
settled  inathe northem  Caucasian  region
in the first  century,  as their  ancestors.
North  Ossetia  now  even  altemately  calls
itself  Alania.
Many  people's  ethnic  connection  to
the Alans  comes  from  the ruins  of  their
mountain  cities,  the eerie  necropoli,  and
the  abandoned  fields.  Most  modems  have
visited  these  ancient  sites,  with  their  piles
of  stone  and  their  houses  of  the  dead,
where  bodies  of  mountaineers  still  lie.  and
haye  looked  out  over  the fields  where
traces  of  long-forgotten  boundaries  are
still  visible.  Yet  most  !a'iow  few  facts  about
these  remarkable'vestiges  beyondthatthey
are the  remnants  of  brave  peoples  of  their
distant  past.  Only  the specialist  can still
recreate  their  lives  with  some  degree  of
accuracy  and can describe  the sophisti-
cated  agriculture  and architecture  which
dates  back  to the Middle  Ages.  But  on a
more  emotional  level,  the legacy  of  the
ancient  cities  still  resonates  in the  minds
of  the  public.  The  ruins  even  speak  to out-
siders  and  gaye  the  American  co-author  a
sense  of  the  immense  power  they exert  on
every  ethnic  group  in the region,  thanks
in part  to the knowledgeable  guidance  of
Professor  Maks  Bliev,  one  of  the leading
historians  of  the  area.
For  many  people,  the  ruins  are as
much  a reminder  of  the  aggression  of  the
Russian  imperial  army  against  their  an-
cestors in the 1830s  as they  are of  the
ancient  Alans.  In the  nineteenth  century,
the cities  were  demolished  by Russian
artillery  bombardments  and  the  inhabit-
ants  were  resettled  in the  plains  north  of
the mountains.  Today,  while  some
groups  remember  this  war  as no more
than  an occurrence  in the distant  past,
to others  it is but  one more  reminder  of
the losses  inflicted  bv  outsiders.  For  the
latter,  Russians  are little  different  than
the Mongols  of  fiye  centuries  before.
As  we push  further  into  the past,  it is
possible  to illuminate  how  the defeat  of
the Alans  in the thirteenth  and  fourteenth
centuries  became  the chosen  trauma  for
some  ofthe  ethnicgroups  in  the  Caucasus,
and how  this  defeat  then  became  linked
with  the  Russian  artillery  barrages  of  the
nineteenth  century.  We  will  thus  deal  with
both  the ancient  Alans  and the modern
Ossetiaris,  Chechens,  and  Ingushs.
Today,  Ossetians  number  somewhat
more  than  five  hundred  thousand,  in-
cluding  those  who  liye  in diaspora  in the
central  Caucasian  highlands;  they  are the
only  people  still  speaking,  even  if  in cor-
rupted  form,  the language  of  their  once
numerous  and  mighty  ancestors,  the
Caucasian  Alans.  The  first  Alans  entered
this  area  about  two  thousand  years  ago
and subdued  a related  group,  the
Sarmatians,  as well  as remnants  of  the
Scythians,  and  later  also  conquered  the
local  Caucasian  (non-Iranian)  tribes.  In
the Middle  Ages,  the area  east  of  the
Kuban  River  Valley,  up to Daghestan,
was  named  "Alania."  This  'vast  territorv,
which  sometimes  also  iricluded  the
southern  flanks  of  the  central  Caucasian
range,  was  ruled  by tlie  Alans,  whose
Christian  princes  and  princesses  often
intermarried  with  the royal  houses  o'f
Georgia,  Armenia,  Kievan  Russia,  and
the Byzantine  Empire.  Over  time,  the
conquerors  and  conquered  became  more
assimilated,  though  aspects  of  Alan  cul-
ture  remained  (Sulimirski,  1970).
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These  early  Alans  survived  the  Hunic
and  Avar  onslaught  at the  end  of  the  sixth
century  and  the  AItai  Turks  and  the Khazar
assault  which  began  about  AD  650.  But
they  were  not  s,uccessful  in rejecting  the
Tatar  attacks.  The  Tatars,  that  is, the  Mon-
golians  of  the  thirteenth  century  and  those
led  by Timur  in the fourteenth  century,
ended  Alan  domination  in the region.  The
final  and disastrous  defeat  came  in the
1390s.  Many  Alanic  warriors  were  killed
in numerous  battles  and a great  propor-
tion  of  the rest  of  the Alanic  population
was  slaughtered;  the  remnants  were  driven
into  slavery  or  brought  into  service  of  the
Mongols.  The  invaders  sacked  the cities
and  setthem  on  fire,  ruined  centers  of  edu-
cation  and  churches,  demolished  fertile
fields  and  pastures,  and disrupted  trade.
The  Mongol  dominance  had  other  eff'ects
as well.  The  Alan  population  was  gradu-
ally  reduced  from  more  than  two  million
people  in the beginning  of  the  thirteenth
century  to barely  one-eighth  of  this  num-
ber  by  the  end  of  the  fifteenth  century.  And
eve::n these  survivors  were  pushed  from  the
plains  and foothills  of  the  Northern
Caucasus  to the wild  gorges  of  its center
(see  Isaenko  and  Kuchiev,  1994).
Although  the Mongols  attempted  for
more  than  two  centuries  to crush  the re-
maining  Alan  resistance,  those  who  en-
dured  never  recognized  Mongol  domi-
nance.  They  barricaded  themselves  in  the
gorges  and  highland  valleys  behind  huge
walls  and  stone  embattlements  and  in  nu-
merous  castles  and  fortresses;  they  re-
pulsed  practically  all  Mongol  attempts  to
penetrate  and  to seize  their  mountain
strongholds.  From  their  secure  places,  they
also  engaged  in lightening  raids  on the
Mongolian  settlements  in the open  plain.
The  Mongols  in tum  were  able  to strike
back  successfully  only  once,  under  Timur,
when  they  broke  through  the fortresses
into  the  western  part  of  Ossetia,  the
Digoria-  The  memory  of  these  heroic  and
tragic  times  still  lingers  among  the  com-
mon  people  and is reflected  in their  folk-
lore.  For  example,  every  child  in Ossetia
is familiar  with  these  words  fiom  the folk  bal-
lad The CryofZadaleskiAifother:a'Bloody rain
is failing  on the land  of  Digoria"  (see
Magometov,1968;  Kaloev,1971).
Russians  in  the  Caueasus
The  Russians  were  the last  in a long
series  of  invaders  and foreign  rulers,  at-
though  Russian  contactwith  the Caucasus
goes  far  back.  For  example,  from  the  tenth
through  the twelfth  centuries,  the  strong
Russian  princedom  of  Timutarakhan
dominated  the  Low  Kuban,  an area  with  a
mixed  population  that  probably  included
Alans.  The  road  to  the  Caucasus  was  com-
pletely  opened  to Russians  when  I'van  the
Terrible  conquered  the Tatar  successor
khanates  of  Kazan  and Astrakhan  in the
sixteenth  century.  Once  established  on the
northem  shore  of  the Caspian  Sea, Russia
inevitably  became  a Caspian  power  whose
interests  spread  to Tarqu  and Darband
(Daghestan),  Chechnya,  Kabarda,  Ossetia,
and  beyond  the  Caucasus  to Georgia.
Firuz  Kazemzadeh  (1974)  notes  that
the acquisition  of  Astrakhan  in 1552  en-
abled  Russia  to influence  the affairs  ofthe
North  Caucasian  peoples,  including  the
Avars  and  the  Kumyks  of  Daghestan,  the
Chechens,  the  Ossetians,  the Kabardians,
and  the Circassians  (Cherkes).  All  the
same,  'these  ethnic  groups  retained  many
of  their  pastways;  they  were  independent,
unruly,  and  virtually  unconquerable  before
the introduction  of  modern  weaponry.
Year  afteryear,  and  century  after  century,
the  mountaineers  of  the  Northern
Caucasus  formed  intricate  alliances  among
themselves  and also frequently  with  the
Crimeans,  the  Turks,  and sometimes  the
Persians.  As  successors  of  the Khanate  of
Astrakhan,  the contemporary  Muscovite
and  later  Russian  tsars  inherited  these  lo-
cal conflicts.  They  tried  to resolve  them,
however,  in a manner  inappropriate  and
not  understandable  to the mountaineers
whose  customs  and  way  of  Life were  quite
different  from  those  of  the  Russians.
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An  excellent  example  of  this  pattern
is the shert  (treaty  or charter)  which  some
Kabardian  chieftains  signed  in July,  1588,
with  Tsar  FeodorI  (Ivanovich),  under  the
tutelage  of  Boris  Godunov.  The tsar ex-
tended  his protection  to the chiefs  by
promising  that  he would,  just  like  his fa-
ther  Ivan  the Terrible,  aid them  against  all
enemies.  The chiefs  in turn  promised  to
remain  faithful  to him  and to his succes-
sors. Both  sides,  however,  entered  this
treaty  with  different  and incompatible  at-
titudes  derived  from  their  different  le'vels
of  political  and social  organization.  The
Russians  behaved  out  of  the context  of  a
centralizing  state-the  Kabardians  acted
out  of  the context  of  a loose  military  de-
mocracy.  The  Russians  thought  they  were
protecting  their  allies  against  all external
enemies-the  Kabardians  thought  that
Feodor  would  protect  them  against  the
ruler  of  Tarqu  in Daghestan,  the Shamkhal.
While  Russia  had an autocratic  tsar,  a for-
mal  system  of  written  law,  and a function-
ing  bureaucracy,  the Kabardians  had no
state,  written  law,  or a firm  notion  of  sov-
ereignty.  To the Russians,  Temriuk,  the
chief  Kabardian  negotiator,  was the
Kabardian  tsar:  to the Kabardians  he was
no more  than one chieftain  among  many
(Kazemzadeh,  1974).
Such mountaineer  traditions  and per-
ceptions  remained  in tact over  the next
se'veral  generations.  Through  the eig]i-
teenth  and into  the nineteenth  centurv.
chieftains  continued  to consider  them-
selves  independent  and acted  in their  own
behalf.  Thus,  during  the "Persian  Crusade"
of  Peter  I (the Great),  the Shamkhal  of
Tarqu  proclaimed  himself  the ally  of  the
Russians,  but  when  he saw that  they  had
begun  building  fortresses  at the foothills
of  liis  mountains,  he immediately  turned
against  them.  The Russians  responded
with  force  in a series  of  bloody  incursions.
With  every  battle  and loss, the unre-
solyed  memory  of  the earlier  Tatar  inva-
sions  and occupation  were  reinvigorated.
Each lost battle not only  reopened  past
wounds  and insults,  preserving  them  in the
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minds  of  leaders  and  populace  alike,
 but
also  played  an important  role  in recreat-
ing  and  redirecting  the image  of  the
 out-
sider.  For  maay  years,  the outsider,
 the
enemy,  had  been  the Mongols  and
 Per-
sians;  now  it became  the Russians.
 The
psychological  link  between  MongoIs
 and
Russians  inspired  subsequent  generations
to seek  "holy  revenge"  against  the
 new
enemy.  Indeed,  the  dead  of  the Caucasus
acquired  very  long  arms.
War  with  Russia
Russian  military  administrators  began
laying  the  foundations  for  Russian
 colo-
nization  of  the foothills  of  the Northem
Caucasus  in the 1760s  by building
 for-
tresses  and  pushing  forward  a line  of
 Cos-
sack  villages  to block  all the exits
 from
the  mountains.  What  followed  was
 nearly
one  hundred  years  of  intermittent  war
 with
Caucasian  mountaineers.  First  came
 a
broad  anti-Russian  religious  and  political
movement  headed  by Sheikh  Mansur
(1785-1791)  which  involved  many  groups
throughout  the Caucasus,  but  especially
Chechens.  Although  the mountaineers
were  unsuccessful  in turning  back
 the
Russians,  a new  campaign  began  in
 the
late  1820s,  ending  in 1839  with  the
 defeat
of  the movement  in Daghestan.  Another
war  soon  erupted  in  1840  through
 a
Chechen  rebellion  and did  not end
 until
the  capture  of  the  Imam  Shamil,  their
 fa-
mous  leader  of  the Caucasian  War,
 in
1859.
The  resistance  of  the peoples  of  the
Caucasus  had  many  causes  (see Bliev
 and
Degoev,  1994),  but  here  one  needs  to stress
only  the  most  obvious,  namely  the  fear
 and
dislike  of  intruders  which  was especially
strong  in the isolated,  self  reliant,  and
 in-
dependent  mountain  villages.
 The
mountaineer's  detailed  memory  of
 past
defeats  and traumatic  losseS  was
 again
awakened  by  the  Russian  treatment
 oflo-
cal  rulers.  For  the  most  part,  Russian
 mili-
tary  commanders  acted  arbitrarily  and
 bru-
tally.  At the same  time,  the Russians  re-
membered  the traitorous  behavior  of
 to-
cal chieftains;  they  balieved,  not  without
reason,  that  gentleness,  or even  decency,
would  be interpreted  by the mountairi
population  as weakness.  They  knew
 that
neither  the  Persian  shahs  nor  the Turkish
sultans  ever  gained  respect  through  
mild-
ness. So, the Russians  became  worth'v
heirs  of  the odious  and cruel  Persian  
Shah
Agha  Mohammad  Khan  Qajar.
There  is ample  evidence  of  the brutal-
ity  of  the  Russian  commanders.  During
 his
term  as commander  in Georgia,  Prince
P.D.  Tsitsianov,  a Georgian,  told  a 
Mus-
lim  chieftain:  "You  have  the  soul  of  
a do=
and the mind  of  an ass...  So long  as 
you
do not  become  a faithful  tributary  of
 mv
great  sovereign,  the Emperor,  so Iong
 -I
desire  to wash  my  boots  in your  blood.=3
General  Alexei  Petrovich  Ermolov  Iater
gained  fame  for  his  intemperate  language
and his  vicious  cruelty  in suppressing
 re-
sistance."
To these  accounts  one mav  add the
confession  of  an aristocratic  Russian
 of-
ficerwho  was  a participant  in many  battles
of  the Caucasian  'vVar. He wrote:  "Our
actions  in the  Caucasus  are reminiscem
 of
all the miseries  of  the original  conquest
of  America  by  the Spanish"  (Fadeev,  1960,
p. 208).  And  the greatest  Russian  
poet,
Alexander  Pushkin,  upon  observing
 the
actions  of  his  compatriots  in the Caucasus,
wrotc  in his Journey  to Erzerum:  "The
Cherkes  hate  us. We have  forced  them
from  their  wide  open  pastures;  their
 pas-
tures  are ruined,  whole  tribes  are extermi-
nated"  (1967,  p. 309).  Yet  Shamil,
 the
leader  of  the  uprising,  used  the  same  
meth-
ods. According  to one of  his contempo-
raries,  he mercilessly  pot  to death
 the
population  of  every  Chechen  village  
which
sought  peace  with  the Russians,  
burnt
these  villages  to the ground,  and in 
order
to continue  the resistance,  forced  the
 re-
maining  Chechens  into  the mountains  
with
their  belongings.  Vitaly  Borisovich
Vinogradov  (1991)  demonstrated  
how
brutality  and  bravery  often  merged  in the
mentality  of  the mountaineers.  He noted
that  Chechens  and  Ingushs  often  gave  their
children  the  names  Sipso  and  Bokkalu  so
as to remember  the  two  Russian  generals
Nicolas  Sleptsov  and  Ivan  Baklanov  who
were  tenible  and  brutal  enemies  in com-
bat  but  merciful  yictors  after  it. In the
meantime,  the ordinary  Russians  in the
Caucasus  who  lived  in constant  fear  of
mountaineer  raids  and attacks  gradually
created  in their  ballads  the image  of
Chechens  as evil  robbers  ready  to kill,
from  ambush,  every  unsuspecting  yillager.
 Bliev(1991)showedrecentlyhowthe
leadership  on both  sides  created,  fixed,  and
spread  the enemy  image  among  common
people  to attain  and retain  power  over
them.  Thus  the  famous  Mullah  Khazy,  the
first  Imam  of  the  Caucasian  War,  rejected
all  claims  of  control  by either  Russians  or
the feudal  lords  of  Daghestan  over  the
"free  societies"  of  the  mountaineers.  After
all,  these  powers  were  his  main
competitors.  His  sermons  therefore
revi'ved  again  and again  the image  of  the
enemy  in the minds  of  the  mountaineers.
He taught that  "For  a Muslim,  following
the shariat  (Islamic  Law)  without  gazavat
(the  war  against  the infidels,  in this  case
the Russians)  is not  salyation.  He who
follows  the shariat  must  arm himself  no
matter  the cost;  he must  abandon  his
family,  his house,  his land,  and he must
not  spare  his  'very  life.  God  will  reward  in '
the  next  life  those  who  follow  my  counsel"
(Bushnev,  1939,  p. 75).  One  needs  to note
that  during  the  recent  events  in Chechnya,
Dudaev  revived  this  ideology  and  called
all  Chechens  to a Holy  War  against  Russia.
This  ideology  served  two  functions.  It
not  only  motivated  the mountaineers  to
fight  th::ir  "eyil"  enemy,  but  also  created
the positive  image  of  a charismatic  deJiv-
erer  and means  to salvation.  The  numer-
ous disciples  of  the Mullah  Khazy  there-
fore  proclaimed  him  to be a prophet  and
sustained  this  reputation  by  all means  pos-
sible.  And  so, using  demagogy  and cast-
ing  aside  all powers  except  those  which
pointed  to him  as the "inspired  prophet,"
he strengthened  his absolute  power  as
theocratic  dictator  (Bliev,  1991).
The  Return  of  War
Because  of  this  long  history  of  mu-
tual  bloodshed,  the  modem  conflicts  in the
Caucasus  probably  reached  what  one  may
call  a "hot  stage"  earlierthan  in other  parts
ofthe  world.  It  has been  saidthat  real  wars
today  are instigated  by fictitious  wars  in
the media-all  the same,  media  wars  are
not  fought  on an emotionally  empty  land-
scape.  Unresol'ved  losses  of  the past  are
the first  to be reinterpreted  by intellectu-
als and  politicians.  For  example,  long  be-
fore  the  war  in Kharabakh,  both  Ax-menian
and Azerbaijan  historians,  using  the  same
historical  sources  but  interpreting  them
differently,  proved  to their  own  satisfac-
tion  and  to that  of  their  respective  peoples
that  this  or that  piece  of  land  "originally"
belonged  to their  ancestors.  Such  interpre-
tations  of  the past  reinforce  the founda-
tion  ofmemories  of  loss  andthe  connected
image  of  the enemy.
It must  be stressed  once  more  that
modern  demands  for  territorial  adjust-
ments  often  rest  on a genuine  loss  of  land
and  people;  this  essay,  however,  investi-
gates  some  of  the emotional  underpinnings
which  drive  them.  Unresolved  conflicts  of
the past  play  a very  important  role  in the
present.  Often  the simple  revival  of  mu-
tual  suspicions  is enough  to rekindle  dor-
mant  mutual  hatred,  and  historians,  poliii-
cal scientists,  and other  intellectuals  cer-
tainly  play  a role  in the reviving  of  past
traumas  and their  transmission  to the me-
dia  and  politicians,  and  then  to the  public.
In  the 1980s,  several  American  schol-
ars (Schroeder,  1983)  analyzed  in detail
the development  of  the Transcaucasian
republics  in the post-Stalin  era. They  ar-
rived  the the following  conclusions:  eco-
nomic  development  and  modernization  of
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all  Transcaucasian  Soviet  Republics  had
continued  at a fairly  rapid  pace;  living
standards  had  improved  greatly,  especially
in comparison  to their  probable  stagnation
or  decline  in pre-Stalin  years;  and  the re-
gion  was  far  ahead  of  its Middle  Eastern
neighbors,  although  well  behind  Westem
Europe,  and  somewhat  below  the All-
Union  (Soviet)  average.
Considering  these  findings,  the -au-
thors  doubted  if  this  economic  success
would  have  been  possible  if  the three
Transcaucasian  republics  had developed
as independent  countries,  especially  given
their  low  starting  point  and their  rather
poor  natural  resources.  The  authors  left  it
to philosophers,  however,  to debate
whether  the comparatively  faster  eco-
nomic  progress  under  the Soviet  regime
compensated  these  states  for  the loss of
national  independence  and cultural  free-
dom.  We  are not  these  philosophers,  but
the  last  few  years  have  shown  that  com-
paratively  rapid  economic  development
under  the Soviet  Union  could  not  effec-
tively  suppress  the emotional  undercur-
rents  associated  with  the loss of  cultural
freedom  and  national  independence,  orthe
traumas  of  the  past.  In fact,  as soon  as the
pace  of  development  slowed  with  the  col-
lapse  of  the  USSR,  nationalistic  intellec-
tuals  reminded  the public  of  old  wounds
that  had  never  fully  healed.  Writers,  poli-
ticians,  media,  and public  alike  realized
that  the return  to economic  progress  and
modernization  would  be very  long  and
arduous,  and  it became  necessary  to find
someone  to blame  for  this  misfortune.  The
stress  of  economic  uncertainty  rapidly  re-
vived  unresolved  conflicts  that  remained
just  below  the surface.
Georgia  provides  an excellent  ex-
ample  of  what  happened  next.  Zviad
Gamsakhurdia,  a writer,  a fighter  for  hu-
man  rights,  and  a prominerit  dissident  dur-
ing  the  Soviet  period  became  the  new  head
of  its government,  assuming  power  on a
wa've  of  general  enthusiasm.  But  like  so
many  other  post-Soviet  leaders,  he was
incapable  of  foreseeing  and  preventingthe
inevitable  consequences  of  the sudden  rup-
rare  first  with  the Soviet  Union  and  then
with  the other  republics.  In response,  he
turned  to a common  practice  of  dictators:
in unfavorable  circumstances  he tried  by
all  means  possible  to preserve  his  personal
power.  He blamed  the grief  and  Iosses  of
the young  and  unprepared  Georgian  state
on "outsiders"  and "late  coming  guests;'
that  is, the national  minorities,  those
"agents  of  Russian  imperialism  and com-
munism."  Those  who  supposedly  dam-
aged  Georgia  were  the  Ossetians,
Abkhazians,  Tatars,  and of  course,  Rus-
sians.  Through  careful  manipulation,  the
irritation  of  the Georgian  majority  was
quickly  tumed  against  these  new,  but  also
old,  enemies.  And  because  of  the disap-
pearance  of  the Soviet  Union,  ordinary
Ossetians  and  Abkhazians  found  them-
selves  betvveen  ttvo  indeperident  countries:
a declining  nationalistic  Georgia  and a
relatively  flourishing  Russia.
Real  history  and real problems  were
soon replaced  by an appeal  to emotion.
Prominent  historians  reminded  the disap-
pointed  Georgian  population  that  the
"Ossetian  barbarians"  had been  ruining
Georgian  villages  ever  since  the Middle
Ages.  They  accused  them  of  helping  the
Bolsheviks  endthe  independent  Georgian
state in the 1920s.  The  eighty-five  thou-
sand Abkhazians  were  accased  of  com-
mitting  all possible  and impossible  sins
against  Georgia.  The  Georgian  media,
under  control  of  Gamsakhurdia's  clique,
joined  the fray  and  fueledthe  wave  of  hys-
teria.  Gamsakhurdia  finally  called  his on
subjects  "to  sweep  all the rubbish  out  of
Mother  Georgia."  The  slogan  "Georgia  for
Georgians"  was  the final  step.
The  Southern  Ossetian  and the
Abkhazian  independent  press  reacted  im-
mediately,  reminding  their  people  about
Georgian  oppression  of  their  culture  and
education,  and the brutal  actions  of  the
Georgian  army  in 1920  when  troops  un-
der  the  command  of  Valiko  Dzhugely  ru-
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ined  and  sacked  Southem  Ossetia'S  capi-
tal,  Tskhinval,  and  many  other  villages,
killing  thousands  of  civilians  and  forcing
many  to flee  to North  Ossetia.  As  a result
of  such  memories  of  victimization,  the re-
juvenation  of  ethnic  identity  in Georgia
soon  resurrected  the monster  of  radical
nationalism.  Bloody  wars  in South  Ossetia
and  Abkhazia,  which  were  provoked  by
aggressive  nationalists,  left  thousands  of
victims  of  all ethnic  communities:  dead
and  wounded,  homeless  refugees,  ruined
economies,  desolation  of  former  luxuri-
ous cities  and health-resorts.  There  were
no  wxnners.
Cheehnya
The  bloody  1992  conflict  between
Ingusheta  and  North  Ossetia,  and  the ter-
rible  war  between  Russia  and Chechnya,
differ  only  in the historical  routes  by  which
they  reached  this  point.  Both  conflicts
were  primed  by a similar  revi'val  of  trau-
matic  ethnic  memories  and  the image  of
the enemy  long  before  they  reached  their
"hot  stages."'Here  one  only  needs  to point
out  once  more  that  the  Chechens  were  one
of  the leading  forces  of  mountaineer  re-
sistance  to the  tsarist  Russian  invasion  of
the  Northern  Caucasus.  Their  region  was
ultimately  annexed  to Russia  after  one
hundred  and fifty  years  of  determined
fighting  in which  the Chechens  were
driven  into  the  most  barren  reaches  of  the
Caucasus  mountains.  But  even  then,  the
Chechens  continued  sporadic  resistance
for  the  next  half  century.  Even  after  their
total  defeat  seemed  assured,  Chechen  lead-
ers continued  to take  advantage  of  the in-
temal  difficulties  that  plagued  Russia  fol-
lowing  the  Communist  Revolution.  Thus,
they  assisted  the Bolsheviks  in eradicat-
ing  Cossack  villages  in their  region  dur-
ing  the Civil  War  (1918-1920),  they re-
volted  against  the newly  formed  Soviet
Union  in 1920  and 1929,  and  they  resisted
total  collectivization  in 1942-43.  Except
in the elimination  of  the Cossacks,  they
were  defeated  each  time,  adding  another
chapter  to their  history  of  chosen  traumas
and  the image  of  their  enemy.  Their  great-
est modem  tragedy  occhrred  in 1944.  As
the Germans  pushed  toward  the  Caucasus,
Stalin  feared  that  Chechens  and Ingushs
would  side  with  the enemy;  but  because
Soviettroops  quickly  stoppedthe  German
advance  into  the Caucasus,  the  feared  link-
age was  not  made.  All  the same,  almost
the entire  population  of  these  two  ethnic
groups  was  ordered  deported  to
Kazakhstan.  Virtually  every  Chechen  now
oyer  age thirty-five  was  bom  in exile.  This
fact  alone  coula  account  for  the  fierceness
and loyalty  of  Chechen  fighters  during  the
latest  war  between  Chechens  and  Russians
(see Cuny,  1995).
When  the  exiles  retumed  to the region
in 1956-57,  they  found  that  much  of  the
Iand  they  considered  theirs  had  been  taken
by people  from  neighboring  areas.  These
people  had themselves  bean  forcibly  re-
settled  there  at Stalin's  behest,  most  likely
because  the Chechens  had  helped  the  Bol-
sheviks  in the extermination  of  Cossacks.
It was  a bitter  retum  for  the exiles;  yet  in
their  reflections,  they  neither  took  into  ac-
count  their  role  in the campaign  against
the Cossacks,  the forced  settlement  oftheir
neighbors,  nor  their  own  compensation  by
K.hrushche'v  with  land  in the fertile  dis-
tricts of  Staviopol.  To ma!<e matters -vVOrSe+
modern  Russian  legislators  adopted  the
principle  of  "territorial  rehabilitation."
They  thus  added  rqore  fuel  te a trauma  that
had now  fully  permeated  the ethnic  iden-
tity  of  these  unfortunate  people.  Ingushs
and Chechens,  having  been  defeated  so
many  times  before,  readily  transferred  all
of  their  hostility  to the latest  generation
of  Russians  and  Ossetians.
The  Future
In  a recently  published  article,  Robert
Cullen  (1994)  reported  on an interesting
1932  letter  of  Albert  Einstein  to Si=mund
Freud.  Einstein  by then  may  already  have
envisioned  the destructive  power  that
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physics  was about  to place  in humanity's
hands.  He was troubled  that  totalitarians
who  had  made  racial  and  ethnic  hatred  the
basis  of  their  official  policy  were  ascend-
ing  'to power.  So Einstein  asked Freud  if
psychoanalysis  could  devise  a kind  of  vac-
cination  to prevent  the honor  he foresaw.
"Is  it possible  to so guide  the psychologi-
cal development  of  man that  it becomes
resistant  to the psychoses  of  hatred  and
destruction?"  he wondered.  Freud's  reply
should  give  pause-he  said  that  men  make
war  because  it feels  good.  Killing  one's
enemies,  and  thus  satisfying  the dead  who
are  calling  for  revenge,  gratifies  a funda-
mental  aggressive  instinct.  That  instinct
will  not  go away,  and Freud  saw no sense
in wishing  that  it would.  He wrote:  "Why
don't  we accept  it as we do so many  other
painful  calamities  of  life?  It seems to be a
natural  occurrence,  biologically  well-
founded  and ... scarcely  avoidable"  (see
Cullen,  1994,  p. 30).  Taking  all this into
account,  one may  think  that  the history  of
the Caucasus  is nothing  but  a continuous
chain  of  bloody  conflicts,  manifestations
of  mutual  hostility,  assertions  of  ethnic-
ity,  and gratification  of  aggressive  drives.
But  this is too simple  a response;  although
many  accept  Freud's  view  in light  of  end-
less bloodshed  in Yugoslavia,  Rwanda  and
other  places,  there  is another  side to the his-
tory  of  the Caucasus  that  offers  some hope.
Even  if  Freud's  conclusion  is valid,
one must  point  to anotlier  instinct  in the
human  psyche-that  of  self-preservation.
This  instinct  opposes,  even restricts,  the
fundamental  aggressive  drive,  as illustrated
in a different  historical  trend  amorig  the
numerous  Caucasian  ethnic  groups.)  This
other  version  of  history  is best  illustrated
in Ossetia.  During  its modern  history,  the
Ossetians  paid  a high  price  for  joining  the
Russian  Empire  at the  end of  the
eighteenth  century  and for  receiving  some
lands  in the fertile  plain.  Indeed,  joining
Russia  and receiving  lands  helped  them
overcame  a land  shortage  in the mountains
and to survive  and develop  their  culture.
But  Ossetia's  alliance  had an additional
cost:  official  statistics  show,  for  example,
that  among  all the peoples  of  the former
Soviet  Union,  the  proportion  of  Ossetians
who  became  Heroes  of  the Great  Patriotic
War  (1941-1945)  is the highest  relative  to
the total  population  of  all other  Soviet
ethnic  groups.  Almost  every  second  man
of  the Republic  did not return  from  the
front.  There  is a bitter  Ossetian  proverb:
"We  enyy  our  neighbors:  they  have  their
old men, but  the land of  our republic  is
one mass grave."
The countless  Ossetians  who  died  in
baffle,  however,  are recalled  not  as vic-
tims  to be avenged,  but as heroes  to be
remembered-their  sacrifice  contributed
to a great  victory  rather  than  an un-
moumable  defeat.  This  memory  is there-
fo-re quite  different  from  those  of  the
Chechens.  The  perished  heroes  of  World
War  II do not  call  for  revenge  from  their
graves-they  call  for  peace.  That  is why
the feeiing  of  aversion  towards  war  is so
strong  among  the common  people  in
Ossetia.  Knowing  this,  one should  not  be
surprised  that  the many  different  ethnic
groups  of  the Republic  (about  one hun-
dred  ofthem)  elected  as their  president  not
one of  the many  generals,  but  a professor
ofphilology,  the former  rector  ofthe  North
Ossetian  State University,  Akhsarbeck
Galazov.  He chose  as the main  goal  of  his
policy  the preservation  of  inter-ethnic  and
civil  peace  both  inside  and outside  the
Republic.  The  first  step ofthe  new  admin-
istration  was  public  condemnation  of  eth-
nic-targeted  demagogy.
This  policy  matches  an unique  request
of  Akhurbeck  Magometov,  the present
rector  ofNorth  Ossetian  State  University.
He asked  the scientists  of  the Republic  to
ferret  out  past  positive  inter-ethnic
experiences.  In studying  original  sources,
historians  and others  learned  of  several
methods  and  practices  through  which  their
ancestors  limited  conflict.6  Modern
scholars  already  knew  that  the
mountaineers  depended  upon  cattle
breeding  and agriculture  for  survival,  yet
"f
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the  soil  of  the  highlands  is very  poor.  This
lack  of  fertile  pastures  and fields  was the
principal  reason  for  many  conflicts
between  the different  ethnic  groups.  The
scholars  were  not  aware,  however,  that  the
elders  qf  the  different  groups  had
elaborated  a system  of  conflict  prevention
to a'vert  mutual  hatred  and  extermination.
It was  a mechanism  of  resistance  to the
feuds  and of  rules  for  reconciliation  of
clans  once  they  had entered  a vendetta.
This  mechanism  was  an important  part  of
the adats,  or the common  laws  of  the
mountaineers,  and  they  were  strictly
preserved  by each  community.  Violators
of  these  laws  were  usually  ostracized.
Hospitality  was another  mechanism
that  prevented  collisions  between  differ-
ent clans.  Anyone  in the Caucasus  who
was  able  to speak  the words  "I  am your
guest"  to the  master  of  a clan,  or family,
was received  as a friend,  even  if  he had
been  an enemy  of  the family.  The  guest
was  given  the seat  of  honor,  but  his host
did  not  ask  him  whether  he would  like  to
eat,  as this  might  be considered  an indica-
tion  of  avarice;  he simply  offered  him
whatever  was  available  and  waited  on him
personally.  ,o  sit down  or to eat in the
guest's  presence  was considered  un-
seemly.  At  his  departure,  the host  accom-
panied  his guest  until  far  beyond  his aul
(village),  ofl:en  as far  as to the  next  hospi-
table  house.  In case of  an attack  by brig-
ands,  he defended  his guest  even  at the
peril  of  his own  life.
The  kunac  (fraternization)  served
similar  purposes.  This  practice  was  inher-
ited  by  the  Caucasians  from  their  Scythian
and Alan  forerunners.  The  ritual  of  the
ceremony  was  first  described  by
Herodotus  and has not  changed  visibly
since  that  time.  The  two  participants  of
the ritual  dropped  some  blood  in a cup
(originally  it was  a horn),  drank  it, and in
this  way  became  kinsman  and accepted  the
obligations  to help  each  others'  families
in all situations.  The  sacred  authority  of
the ritual  was  so strong  that  such  a newly
acquired  relative  was  considered  more  re-
liable  than  a natural  kinsman.  The  protec-
tion  of  the kunac's  family,  or clan,  was
generally  given  to those  of  the fratemity
when  they  needed  it. Thus,  almost  all  eth-
nic  communities  had kunac  family  units
in its midst,  and blood  revenge  between
these  families  was  thereby  i>sually  forbid-
den  or  avoided.
When  the  threat  of  an inter-ethnic  col-
lision  arose,  the authoritative  eldermen
from  kunac  families,  who  were  frequently
connected  to several  ethnic  groups  as a
result  of  numerous  intermarriages,  were
asked  to enter  into  preventive  negotiations.
During  these  talks,  the mediators  asked
both  sides  to articulate  their  demands
openly  to each  other  and  to trade  insults.
It was  thought  that  this  openness  would
let  "the  bad spirit,  i.e.,  the  negatiye  emo-
tions  and  suspicions,  out."  Prominent  and
skillful  mediators  were  greatly  respected
in all  ethnic  communities  and  were  invited
to reconcile  even  blood  vendettas.  Durin=
these  talks,  the  mediators  usually  defined
for  each  sides'  eldermen  the  form  and  sum
of  ransom  to be paid  by  the  offending  side.
This  valuable  inheritance  was  almost
forgotten  during  the Soviet  Period.  Over
the last  few  years,  however,  the govern-
ment  of  the North  Ossetian  Republic  has
revived  it and encouraged  the creaticn  of
ethnic  "cultural  societies"  headed  tw  the
most  respected  representatives  of  each  eth-
nic  community  of  the  Republic.  Ossetian.
Russian,  Georgian,  Armenian,  Jewis,h,
Tatar,  and  other  "cultural  societies"  soon
formed  and  laterunited  into  the folk  move-
ment  riamed  "Our  Ossetia."
While  this  movement  has helped  to
revive  and  preserve  all  cultures,  it  has also
already  contributed  significantly  to the
preservation  of  civil  and inter-ethnic  peace
in the  Republic.  The  usefulness  of  the so-
cieties  showed  itself  during  the war  be-
tween  Georgia  and  South Ossetia  in 1992.
During  attacks  by Georgian  nationalists  on
Tskhinval,  a truck  filled  with  children  and
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aged  refugees  on their  way  to North
Ossetia  was  destroyed,  and  a national  cri-
sis threatened  to tear  Ossetia  apart  (see
Helsinki  Watch,  1992;  Suny,  1990).  The
relatives  of  the murdered  immediately
clamored  for,revenge,  but  due  to the ear-
lier  establishment  of  the  cultural  societies
and their  leaderships'  ability  to assuage
many  constituents,  a serious  crisis  was
averted.  Precautions  were  taken  and no
incidents  took  peace; not  even  the classes
in Vladikavkaz's  Georgian  school  were
stopped.  The  maintenance  of  emotional
stability  encouraged  the Georgiari  side
when  talks  to restore  peace  in South
Ossetia  were  begun  at the  behest  of
Galazov.
Similar  mechanisms  were  used  in
placing  special  detachments  of  peacemak-
ers from  both  North  and South  Ossetia,
Georgia,  and Russia  in the region,  and
were  used  again  to bring  a successful  end
to the  military  confrontation  in  Abkhazia.
After  the confrontation  between  North
Ossetia  and Ingushetia  in November  of
1992,  "folk  diplomacy"  was  used  in talks
between  these  govemments  as well.
Unfortunately,  these  positive  experi-
ences  in inter-ethnic  relations  in the
Caucasus  were  undermined  by  the
"Chechen  War."  Indeed,  it is not  difficult
to repeatedly  provoke  hatred  in any  soci-
ety  which  has experienced  so many  losses
and  which  for  generations  has sought  and
found  "enemies."  What  lies  in the future
for  Chechnya  is therefore  unclear.  We  can
only  hope  that  the  experience  of  the  peace-
makers  of  the  past  and present  will  show
the peoples  of  the Caucasus  that  a posi-
tive  future  for  their  "Caucasian  home"  can
be assured  not  by  violence,  but  by peace.
Although  it is difficult  to break  the infer-
nal  grip  of  the long  arm  of  the dead,  old
accounts  must  be closed.  Violence  leads
only  to more  enmity  and  extermination;
peace  at least  offers  the hope  that  each
group  may  flourish  in its own  particular
Wag.
Notes
1. See D.K.  Simes,  "Russia's  Imperial
Consensus,"  The Washirtgton  Post  Ha-
tional  Weekly  Edition  (January  2-8,
1995):  23-24;  Lee  Hockstader,  "A  Presi-
dency  on the Line,"  The Washington
Post  Natiortal  Weekly  Edition  (January
16-22,  1995):  17-18;  same  author,  "The
Nasty  Little  'vVar  That  Won't  Go  Away;'
The Washington  Post  Weekly  Edition
(March  27-April  2, 1995):  16-17;  and
Gerhard  Simon,  "War  in Chechnya-
Consequences  for  Russia,"  Swiss  Review
of Word Affairs,  vol. IV (April 1995):
8-10.  It is also helpful  to read  about
heightened  ethnicity  in another  part  of
the  world;  see Keith  Richburg,  "A  Black
American  in Africa,"  The Washington
Pr:istNationalWeeJdyEdition(April  10-
16):  6-9
2. See Umarov,  S. (1991).  "Islam  i Voina"
("Islam  and  ";JVar":),Kavkaz("Caucasus').
Vladikavkaz:  As-Madzal,  pp.  6-7.  For  the
earlier  period,  see Atkin,  M.  (1988).  "Rus-
sian  Expansion  in the Caucasus  to 1813,"
in Russian  Colonial  Expansion  to 1917,
ed. M. Rywkin.  London  and  New  York:
Mansell,  pp. 139-87.  For  a very  pro-Rus-
sian account  of  the war  in the Caucasus.
see MacKenzie, D. (1974). The Lion of
Tashkent. The Career of General MG.
Cherniaev.  Athens,  GA:  Univ.  of  Geor-
gia  Press,  pp.  26-8,
3. The  quote  by Tsitsianov  rr.ay  be found
in Akti  iSobranye  KavkozkoiArkheo-
graphicheskoi  Komissii  ("Acts  and  Col-
lections of the Caucasian Archaeo-
graphic  Commission"),  12 vols.  Tiflis,
1868-1906:  vol.  II,  p. N1414.
4. Later  in Russian  history,  even  during
the 1970s  and I 980s  of  the Soviet  period,
unknown  persons  periodically  spoiled  the
monument  to Ermoloy  in downtown
Grozny;  after  each incident,  the authori-
ties  restored  the monument.
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5. Unfortunately,  this  other  side of  history
is not  attractive  to those  journalists  who
are busy  searching  for  sensational  and  ter-
rifying  facts.  This  other  history  is also  not
appreciated  by ambitious  leaders  and in-
tellectuals  who  prey  on the  traumas  of  the
past  for  their  own  political  and publishing
ends.
6. For  example,  historians  discovered
many  original  documents  from  the chan-
cellery  of  the Ataman  of  the Terek  Cos-
sacks  which  recorded  what  can be called
"folk  diplomacy."  This  sort  of  diplomacy
managed  to prevent  many  conflicts  be-
tween  Russian  Cossacks  villages  and
mountaineer  communities.
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